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ABSTRACT
The nature and dynamics of ownership are often neglected features of 
multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs). Seventeen cases in four countries 
illustrate characteristics of narrow government or broad societal 
ownership and forces for change over time. Refinements to the 
application of Gaventa’s Power Cube are used to analyse such shifts 
from the perspective of invited and closed spaces for participation. 
Observations about ways in which stakeholder groups can create a 
more enabling environment for their collaboration are discussed. 
Sensitivity to sub-national conditions by weaving endogenous and 
exogenous forces appears to be crucial if MSIs are to be effective 
vehicles of choice for implementing the Sustainable Development 
Goals.
Introduction
In some two decades, multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) have become key locations for 
policy decision-making and action on global development issues. A reason is that such 
transnational bodies often fill a governance vacuum: after all, there is no system of transna-
tional legally enforceable law.1 While MSIs appear to be better observed and studied when 
initiated transnationally,2 collaborative arrangements also operate at national and 
 sub-national levels, for example to set standards and regulate sustainable use of natural 
resources. Therefore, in this enquiry, locally inspired, (sub)nationally functioning MSIs are 
the centre of attention. The article addresses a poorly explored issue: What can locally 
inspired MSIs say in terms of ownership dynamics?
The notion of ownership brings to the fore issues of stakeholder participation through 
the lenses of institutions, agency and power.3 For analytic purposes, an MSI distinction can 
be made between (narrow) government and (broad) societal ownership. The former is a 
typical understanding of country ownership, relying primarily on official commitment, public 
resources, political responsibility and authority, where involvement of others is discretionary, 
according to pre-established rules. Less commonly understood, the latter is characterised 
by a distribution of commitment and responsibility, the co-allocation of private resources, 
joint rule-making processes and exercise of power by a range of stakeholders in voluntary 
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2   K. BIEKART AND A. FOWLER 
association for a common purpose. As will be seen, this ‘polar’ differentiation assists in 
describing graduations between and understanding of the fluid nature of MSI local owner-
ship seen over time. It also allows for the consideration of MSI legitimacy and governance. 
Expanding on Gaventa’s power cube,4 a distinction can also be made between govern-
ment-owned MSIs as ‘invited’ spaces in distinction to societally owned MSIs as ‘claimed/
created’ spaces for collaboration. Our enquiry involves identifying criteria that can signal the 
extent to which an MSI ‘belongs’ to those involved in an operationally meaningful way, in 
part by observing the context-changing agency exerted by stakeholders to better enable 
their collective action to be effective.
Data is derived from a four-country comparative study of 17 MSI cases undertaken by an 
international research team in 2015.5 We start with a review of recent (summative) studies 
on MSIs, covering sometimes hundreds of internationally inspired MSIs at multiple scales, 
in diverse countries, exhibiting varied purposes. From this review a set of MSI effectiveness 
principles are deduced. An endogenous or locally inspired set of cases applies a generally 
neglected lens of ownership to better understand MSI processes. Doing so requires interro-
gation of stakeholders, as well as clarifying why ownership is considered a key principle for 
development effectiveness. From here, the third section examines research data in terms of 
ownership qualities and context factors that appear to be common across diverse countries. 
This material is then applied to what locally inspired MSIs face as agents in better enabling 
operating environments to support their tasks. The fourth section provides a summary of 
conclusions.
Features of multi-stakeholder initiatives
This section reviews discussions on the motivational background for MSIs. It explains typol-
ogies used for the studies of cases selected across Costa Rica, Indonesia, Kenya and Kyrgyzstan. 
The significance of this work is tied to a central premise of achieving the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).6 The envisaged modality involves a nested alignment 
of international, national and local institutional competences and resources – finance, knowl-
edge, skills, authority and so on – with MSIs explicitly defined in SDG 17:17 as the preferred 
mechanism for implementing many of the 16 other Goals.7 This mechanism will, it is argued, 
overcome the ‘silos’ experienced when implementing the Rio+20 and Millennium 
Development Goals, allied to periodic reporting on progress at a High Level Political Forum 
(HLPF) which will help in gauging commitment while stimulating momentum.8
In anticipation of such a central role, a range of MSI-related studies, reports and guides 
have become available. Some pay attention to a specific MSI outcome area, such as public 
governance9 or extractive industries,10 or cover interventions within a broader domain of 
change, for example agriculture and management of natural resources.11 Other overview 
studies span a wide array of ‘partnering’ arrangements in terms of their objectives and 
scales.12 Some studies identify MSI lessons, seeking out good principles and likely con-
straints.13 Within the concept of deliberative democracy, others place emphasis on the legit-
imacy required for the ‘soft law’ norm-setting role of MSIs14 under conditions of (international) 
governance failure.15 This literature shows that the territory of MSIs is variously understood 
and defined, requiring analysts to specify their framework.
Following Stern, Kingston, and Ke, the term ‘multi-stakeholder initiative’ (MSI) is adopted 
because the notion of ‘partnership’ is potentially deceptive in terms of the inherent power 
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asymmetries involved.16 After all, a relationship between ‘partners’ would suggest a relation-
ship between equals, which can be an intentionally misleading aspirational labelling if it is 
structurally improbable.17 While relational mutuality and power balances are seldom realised 
in development practice, a heavy reliance on MSIs for delivery of SDG goals makes greater 
demands on clarity and honesty about what can be realistically anticipated when designing, 
managing and analysing their actual processes. Such clarity will help focus attention on 
strategy and mechanisms that can, for example, prepare for anticipated conflicts between 
stakeholders’ interests, with the Scaling up Nutrition (SUN) Movement offering a practical, 
pre-emptive model.18 So even if the term ‘multi-stakeholder partnership’ is also frequently 
used, such as in the formulation of the SDGs, we would rather avoid it for its obscuring of 
systemic power differences with, from an MSI governance point of view, a conceptually 
implausible relational metric.
The selected multi-actor development initiatives correspond to the following definition 
of MSIs: (1) bringing about collective action solutions for public benefit, (2) comprised of 
actors across the public and private sectors (both for-profit and philanthropic), and (3) whose 
governance and capabilities do not rely on one constituent actor. Research findings pre-
sented in this article concentrate on multi-stakeholder arrangements that are ‘inside’ initia-
tives largely driven by local actors not as a constituent part of global programmes, which 
does not necessarily preclude them from connecting to overseas development assistance, 
debates or actors.19 In our selection process we applied a principle of grounded theory. We 
did so through a conscious effort  to range across many MSI-related variables (geo-historical 
and political conditioning, intended outcomes, scale, time frames, institutional location, 
etc.), so not a priori defining which specific stakeholders had to be included. Country selec-
tion enabled comparisons between in-country MSIs and one ‘outside-in’ initiative relying on 
a common international framework and measures, the SUN Movement. When country pre-
dispositions towards cross-sector societal collaboration are taken into account, the four can 
be characterised as reasonably average sites for MSIs to be effective.20
Stakeholders and MSI typologies
Multi-stakeholder arrangements must deal with the question: Who exactly are the stake-
holders? But also: In what ways and to what degree are they stakeholders? Defining stake-
holders is often premised on a wider, or overarching, frame of reference. Here, the conceptual 
terrain of MSIs can be loosely divided into two referential frameworks: organisation-centred 
or social-intervention centred.21 These can be interpreted from descriptive and normative 
perspectives,22 as well as, crudely, reflecting for-profit and non-profit institutional logics. In 
the case of the former, Freeman’s earlier work23 saw inter-organisational collaborations in 
terms of gaining complementary competencies as, for example, in strategic alliances to help 
manage stakeholder behaviours. In these collaborations, corporate viability remains a prin-
cipal driver, with stakeholders viewed in terms of what they can contribute to or withhold 
from this agenda.
The framework of social intervention places emphasis on solving a societal problem at 
an inter-relational point of reference. Development studies has, by and large, adopted this 
perspective in order to deal with issues of structural power asymmetry in designing, imple-
menting and evaluating aided projects and programmes.24 Unless otherwise stated, the 
framework, evidence and perspective deployed in this article is that of social-intervention 
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MSIs. By design, it does not look for MSIs dedicated, for example, to standard-setting in value 
chains, or compensating for democratic failures, but seeks those with a locally inspired 
rootedness.
For the (comparative) purposes of our multi-country study, stakeholders were placed in 
seven categories: state, private sector, civil society, (social) media, knowledge and research 
institutions, international agencies and others. Of note, detailed later, is the importance of 
actor types and combinations within these categories who choose to engage or not in an 
MSI.
MSIs – principles matter
If firm categorisation is not on offer, recent research may be able to shed light on what 
principles makes MSIs what they are – voluntary, multi-actor collaborations – and what they 
do – design and follow agreed processes to effectively reach a shared purpose. Revisiting 
the concept of ‘bridging’, Dave Brown25 reviews experiences of leadership development 
supported by the Synergos Foundation, which translated into five critical elements for MSIs. 
First is the importance of local engagement and sensitivity in the provision of external assis-
tance. Second is the development of cross-boundary leadership that builds a credible and 
strong coalition that connects to the larger context. Third is a way of mutually ‘theorising’ 
what needs to be done as a collective practice to bring about systemic change, which links 
to a fourth element of enabling and protecting innovation – new ways of relating and doing 
things. Fifth is investing in embedding and sustaining institutional change with reconfigured 
rules and boundaries.
Many MSI studies draw on multi-country data from which principles to guide MSI design 
and operations can be distilled. Brouwer and Woodhill arrive at seven.26 Our analysis of this 
input, combined with reviews of others,27 suggests that social investment MSIs are more 
likely to be effective if: (1) the quality of leadership conforms with processes where differ-
ences in power are acknowledged and where inclusion and voluntarism of membership are 
respected; (2) local contexts and actors are recognised as the final arbiters of performance; 
(3) a common agenda is negotiated and not imposed; (4) mutual trust is gained and main-
tained; (5) (resource) commitments made are realistic and lived up to; (6) communication is 
open and fluid; and (7) there is accountable governance with rules of the game that are 
co-defined and fairly applied (also see Table 1). These guiding principles help indicate why 
societal change processes require ‘ownership’.
The centrality of local ownership
Potential success factors reflect the importance of local ownership of an MSI. This is partly 
a result of the quality of public management in a country, and the way in which bottom-up 
processes of citizen engagement contribute to strengthening local ownership of change 
processes within specific contextual features, capacities and local power relationships.28 This 
underlines a proposition that MSIs must be tuned to the local setting: acting as change 
agents requires sensitivity to the operational context differentiated across the various stake-
holders and the specific tasks assigned to them. The stakeholder combination co-determines 
the degree of legitimacy of the initiative in its socio-political setting, particularly to the extent 
that its purpose is to make good failures or weaknesses in state (regulatory) performance.
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These specificities nest within conditions that co-establish an enabling (or disenabling) 
environment,  which influences the practice of local ownership. Examples are: the existence 
of a reliable infrastructure, the adequate functioning and protection of civic space, as well 
as respect for the rule of law. Such elements affect the strength and hence the effect of 
stakeholder involvement.
Local ownership is central to the Paris Declaration, which emphasises that development 
only can be successful and sustainable if a country takes charge of its own development 
goals and priorities, as well as how these are achieved. A discussion obviously has been 
whether the government is the primary driver of this process, or whether other stakeholders 
are equally important: the difference between ‘government ownership’ and ‘societal own-
ership’ referred to earlier. Our research suggests that with so many variables and contexts 
in play, pluriformity of ownership is likely to be an essential property for MSI effectiveness.
By looking at (sub-)national practices of MSIs, it is possible to get a more nuanced view 
of the diverse dynamics operating at grounded levels which are often not visible when only 
focusing on national variables. This triggers the question: What exactly determines a stronger 
sense of country/societal ownership by MSIs? We suggest this has to do with the way in 
which exogenous variables are able to reinforce endogenous variables. Other authors29 have 
argued that MSIs often are poorly related to the priority needs of Southern countries as they 
are ad hoc, looking for short-term gains and often too focused on one particular issue. In 
addition, external and donor-driven agendas often lead to the establishment of parallel 
Table 1. Stakeholder engagement – numbers of types of entities within major categories (per country 
and per case study). 
Source: Biekart and Fowler, Comparative Studies of Multi-stakeholder Initiatives. Cr = costa rica; SuN = scaling up  nutrition; 
lGBTi = lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, intersexed. iWrM = water law bill; SShC = San Jose-San ramon highway commis-
sion; rlP = roads of leadership project; in = indonesia; aMaN = aliansi Masyarakat adat Nusantara; KPaN = Komisi 
 Penanggulanggan Nasional; SaPa = strategic alliance for poverty alleviation; Ke = Kenya; CSorG = civil society organiza-
tions reference group; urF = usalama reforms forum; aSdS = agricultural sector development support; Ky = Kyrgyzstan; 
Fa = ‘foreign agents’; PCs = public councils; rhF = regional humanitarian forum.
Country MSI case
State 
organ
Civil 
society Business
Knowledge 
and research Media
International 
agencies Other
Total stake-
holder
Costa rica Cr-SuN 4 1 1 1 7
Cr-lGBTi 2 6 8
Cr-iWrM 5 2 5 1 13
Cr-SShC 3 2 3 1 9
Cr-rlP 1 4 2 1 1 9
indonesia in-SuN 3 4 1 3 11
in-aMaN 2 4 6
in-KPaN 4 3 1 1 9
in-SaPa 2 3 1 1 7
Kenya Ke-SuN 3 1 1 3 8
Ke-CSorG 1 4 1 6
Ke-urF 2 5 1 4 12
Ke-aSdS
Kyrgyzstan Ky-SuN 7 2 1 1 2 2 15
Ky-Fa 6 3 1 1 1 1 13
Ky-PCs 6 1 1 1 9
Ky-rhF 5 1 1 1 1 9
ToTal 56 45 15 7 5 20 3 151
% 37 30 10 5 3 13 2 100%
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structures that frequently generate fragmentation and superficial consultation, and therefore 
a weak level of country ownership. If MSIs, on the other hand, manage to do well on the 
endogenous variables (leadership, vision, management, inter-institutional trust, interlocu-
tion, bottom-up organisation and local resourcing) and realise this in a supportive context 
(good infrastructure and a healthy civic space, as well as complementing other partnerships), 
the probability of stronger and broader local ‘societal’ ownership is increased. This analysis 
of the balance between endogenous and exogenous variables may help us to understand 
how MSIs manage to create their own conditions for strengthening local ownership.
‘What diverse perspectives have in common’ is a proposition that has been theorised, 
advanced and elaborated by Elinor Ostrom. In moving beyond her seminal work on the 
management of common property resources, her insight and governance argument is that 
avoiding sub-optimal solutions to address social dilemmas by individual actors – as social 
intervention MSIs are meant to do – calls for collective action across diverse interests and 
players:
Social dilemmas thus involve a conflict between individual rationality and optimal outcomes 
for a group.30
Simply put, an individual’s predisposition towards self-optimisation needs to be negotiated 
or ‘ruled out’ in favour of group optimisation. A principle inherent to MSIs is one of acknowl-
edging inter-dependence by accepting an individually sub-optimal but collectively optimal 
course of action towards an issue of concern which is sufficiently shared to justify joining in 
collective agency. While articulated in terms of individuals, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that this applies as much to organisations.
Agency is exerted or withheld in relation to an imagined future and the risks involved in 
its attainment conditioned by the ‘rules of the game’ that institutions embody as a dynamic 
process. MSIs can thus be understood in relation to the mix of incentives or fears of stake-
holders, allied to the power and agendas of those seeking to bring change about and how 
they choose to do so – that is, the perceived legitimacy of the endeavour. This point brings 
in discussions on participation, empowerment, inclusion and governance, cornerstones of 
SDGs. Social intervention MSIs can be viewed through critical theories of participation in 
relation to changing or consolidating existing societal power relationship.31 Typically, par-
ticipation is treated as a spectrum from simple consultation to (shared) decision-making, 
generally as part of a social transformation strategy.32 With his power cube, Gaventa applies 
a tri-dimensional framework involving three levels of scale (sub-national, national and supra-
national), three forms of power (visible, hidden and invisible) and three types of spaces for 
engagement (closed, invited and claimed/created).33 Thirteen MSIs in this study operate at 
national and sub-national scales, with four others linked with national secretariats to the 
international structure of the SUN movement with a secretariat in Geneva.
While analytically more nuanced, the cubic structure can work against appreciating the 
non-linear ways in which MSI processes unfold.34 In particular, this may occur if what starts 
as spaces by invitation  of the more powerful – typically a government agency with coercive 
authority – transform into spaces that are co-created by other stakeholders, suggesting that 
a broader ‘societal’ ownership is taking hold. Put another way, a wider legitimacy is being 
gained through experience of how governance actually works in whose interest, expressed 
through more directly accountable representation and so on. Conversely, governments can 
join created spaces and then proceed to take them over by, for example, starting to exclude 
stakeholders they do not like. MSI governance becomes authoritarian with broad legitimacy 
called into question. Participation becomes more exclusive and ownership narrowed. These 
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processes are discussed in the following section, where stakeholder configurations for 
researched cases are examined.
In sum, the ownership of local social intervention MSIs can be usefully viewed through 
connected theoretical schemas: legitimacy and governance of collective action, stakeholder 
inclusion, and power of participation. In doing so, insights from locally inspired and internally 
constructed MSIs can complement those derived from agency that is internationally 
prompted and constructed.
Multi-stakeholder initiatives: building from within
The research was aimed, inter alia, at understanding how different dimensions of local own-
ership discussed above play out in practice. We focused on the degree to which an MSI belongs 
to the society in which it must exert collective agency with effects that sustain outcomes. 
Country and case study selection for this research was done in a participatory way via an 
in-country scoping exercise and a joint final identification of MSI cases to be investigated. Four 
countries were selected with a reasonable degree of openness to an autonomous civil society. 
Another criterion was a preference for countries with a democratic system facing challenges 
that could illuminate MSIs as sites of contention. Criteria included MSIs having power dimen-
sions with political edge and multiple sources of financing. With no practical way of determin-
ing how many endogenous MSIs were ongoing in each of the countries, grounded design 
criteria were applied to select and incorporate a wide diversity of examples in purposes, scales, 
time frames, affected populations and political sensitivity. Attention was paid to MSIs that 
were driven by internal concerns and dynamics. Categorisation of an MSI’s purpose – service 
provision, standard setting, rule change, socio-political shift – followed Beisheim et al.35
The 17 case studies were based on 174 in-depth interviews of directly involved stake-
holders and key informants, combined with document review. Research seminars were used 
to compare results, talk through draft reports and determine where significant differences 
of methods in practice had been encountered and how they would affect analysis and con-
fidence levels. A feature of ownership is a country or locality tailoring objectives to specific 
needs, problems and opportunities. The MSI cases studied (see Table 3) were weighted 
towards reforming institutions and rules, but often accompanied by sub-national delivery 
of services. Combinations of objectives were more the rule than the exception, making 
categorisation a very subjective process.  For example, for Costa Rica the Roads to Leadership 
Project seeks to empower local communities and entrepreneurs to have greater control over 
gaining benefits from ecologically protected areas. Kenya and Kyrgyzstan have MSIs dedi-
cated to altering power relations in terms of civil society being better legally protected, and 
practical citizen oversight of ministries through public councils, respectively. Overall, cases 
exhibited a context-sensitive mix of social intervention objectives and scales of operation.
The structure of national governance
The agency exerted by MSIs takes place within national structures of political-administrative 
governance. They partly set the tone  for how institutional relations are pre-conditioned and 
perceived, if not prejudged, in terms of trust. Consequently, a critical issue for the ownership 
and performance of endogenous MSIs is connecting different locations, layers, scales and 
classes of state authority in terms, for example, of legitimacy and mandate from below 
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(devolution) or from above (decentralisation). The national–international interface for exter-
nally driven MSIs such as the SUN Movement proved to be the tip of a polycentric iceberg 
in terms of appreciating the governance framework within which MSIs must operate. Kenya’s 
new constitution creates and empowers 47 counties that are jostling with the central gov-
ernment for direct access to external resources. Indonesia’s presidential election in 2014 
accelerated decentralisation beyond 416 rural district and 98 municipalities to 80,000 vil-
lages. Unless an MSI limited itself to trying to collectively renegotiate the rules of the game 
– such as a Water Law in Costa Rica or proposed amendments to Public Benefit Organisation 
legislation in Kenya – the design of public administration was a strong determinant of how 
MSI ownership plays out. Disputes about relative power between the governors and the 
governed can signal active interest in what an MSI is all about.
Stakeholders’ inclusion: relative significance
Using participatory enquiry, each case study determined the stakeholders involved as well 
as those that were, from the perspective of the MSI objectives, considered to be ‘missing’. 
The ‘thinner’ the scope of participation by diverse, relevant stakeholders the weaker own-
ership is likely to be. To this factor can be added the relative significance for results of those 
that did actively engage. These two perspectives indicated why ‘unpacking’ stakeholders is 
necessary.
Table 1 shows the variety in the number of types of ‘entities’ within a stakeholder category 
that were involved in the 17 cases spread over the four countries (see Table 3).
Entities within the government category can be separate departments and units within 
ministries, multiple levels of local government, regulatory and parastatal bodies, and par-
liamentary committees. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) include community-based, faith-
based, Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) dedicated to service delivery, advocacy, 
social movements, etc. The business category ranges across types of industry, (trans)national 
corporations, lobby associations, and large- and small-scale enterprises. Mass media includes 
print and broadcast such as local radio, which may be privately or publicly owned. 
International agencies can be bi- or multi-lateral, lending or grant making. These and other 
variations mean that consistency of interpretation of types across countries is difficult to 
achieve. Nevertheless, a comparative analysis was undertaken of the variety of local stake-
holders with which an MSI has to deal.36
Respondents were asked to rate stakeholders in terms of their relative significance in 
determining the outcome of an MSI, understood as achieving its intended purpose or objec-
tives. Table 2 shows the distribution of ratings, where 1 = most significant and 4 = least 
significant.
Table 2. Stakeholders’ relative significance. 
1=most significant stakeholder; 4 = least significant stakeholder.
Source: Biekart and Fowler, Comparative Studies of Multi-stakeholder Initiatives.
State organs Civil society Businesses Knowledge/research Media
International 
agencies Other
1 = 16 1 = 5 1 = 3 1 = 0 1 =1 1 = 7 1 = 0
2 = 0 2 = 8 2 = 2 2 = 2 2 = 1 2 = 4 2 = 0
3 = 1 3 = 1 3 = 4 3 = 2 3 = 0 3 = 1 3 = 2
4 = 0 4 = 1 4 = 1 4 = 0 4 = 1 4 = 1 4 = 1
N = 17 N = 15 N = 10 N = 4 N = 3 N = 13 N = 3
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Given the international origin of SUN, four cases where government was most significant 
were to be expected. However, almost all cases had government as most significant, occa-
sionally complemented by others, but as first amongst equals, with civil society a close 
second. Aid dependency of two of the four countries – with Costa Rica and Indonesia being 
per-capita exceptions – signalled a significance influence on what are ostensibly country-de-
termined and -driven MSIs. Of course, without data on all MSIs within a country it cannot 
be precisely determined how big international agencies’ role is in co-determining what 
domestic MSIs arise. The numbers found are more likely to signal a selection bias in the cases 
– researcher familiarity and networks for access being in play – as well as a binary tendency 
in social investment MSIs to involve government and civil society, itself often aid financed, 
with business less inclined to engage unless there is a clear value proposition involved. 
Businesses’ aversion, seen for example in Indonesia, is an understandable reluctance of some 
to join processes which involve their critics. Examples from the cases illustrate civil society 
activism against companies producing formula milk promoted by payment to community 
workers or, in Costa Rica, environmental CSOs challenging the use of water by agri-business. 
Overall, despite seeking out locally inspired MSIs, the picture is one of predominant govern-
ment claim-making rather than broad societal ownership.
Ownership seen through MSI cases
A general depiction is one of somewhat thin MSI societal ownership; the MSIs studied tend 
to be dominated by government and civil society, with international agencies more present 
than domestic stakeholders. For example, Costa Rica shows significant and logical variation 
between stakeholders when the issue concerned is economic as opposed to social. The 
Water Law saw five stakeholders representing different business groups, five parts of gov-
ernment and two NGO platforms, suggesting legitimacy meriting broad-based engagement. 
Conversely, LGBTI legislation brought six NGOs, and two types of state agency, one depart-
ment and many conservative political parties. For SUN in Kyrgyzstan, in a fine-grained anal-
ysis, respondents identified 13 stakeholders relating to four ministries, seven operational 
and two policy departments, two parliamentary committees, an inter-ministerial council, 
local governments, community-based activists, two United Nations (UN) agencies, the tech-
nical university and the mass media. The presence of multiple interests suggests inclusive 
state-based governance arrangements working over the long term.
Within these major categories, cases show instances of active exclusion. Here the distinc-
tion made by Gaventa among invited, claimed and closed spaces can be helpful.37 Some 
government departments, as well as aid agencies, create obstacles to involvement of others, 
preferring to negotiate in closed spaces. Civil society organisations can vie for being at the 
front in representation, pushing others aside or, as in Kenya, keeping international CSOs out 
of local engagement with government and politics in order not to be seen as the voice of 
foreign funders. Here, the political legitimacy of endogeneity calls for exclusion of the foreign. 
The Kenya Public Benefit Organisation’s case is also instructive in relation to the involvement 
of bilateral aid agencies in conditions where geo-political issues are involved. Donors’ active 
public support on the side of CSOs and a move to reduce levels of official aid to the country 
gave way to their more muted behaviours in the light of the al Shabab attack on a Nairobi 
shopping mall and its implications for Kenya’s security role in the Horn of Africa.
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Active exclusion of exogenous stakeholders in invited spaces can signal a local assertion 
of ownership that can be considered positive in terms of perceptions that governance is 
inviting in practice. In other words, exclusion is not a priori a negative feature of MSI engage-
ment; in this case one can see that invited spaces are redesigned into a ‘claimed space’. Many 
cases signal a similar need to create a pre-engagement process within stakeholder categories 
where care was needed to ensure that, for example, government did not mediate in ways 
which ensured participation of only favoured stakeholders, or elites, skewing ownership 
towards selective exclusion with political/administrative motivations. In Gaventa’s terms, in 
order to prevent exclusion by way of expansion of the closed spaces, invited spaces were used 
to convert them into more locally owned claimed spaces. Table 3 summarises the ownership 
dynamics in play for each case, in part driven by somewhat common changes in context.
Discussion: local ownership dynamics
Not surprisingly, all MSI cases in our study were subject to changes in their operating envi-
ronments, with differential effects on stakeholders. In turn, this made demands on their 
ability to respond constructively. Our country comparisons indicated that four types of con-
textual change appeared to be significant in affecting the strength of stakeholder engage-
ment and hence ownership of the processes involved: (1) how democratic politics disrupts 
interlocution processes; (2) alterations in governance sites; (3) the effects of institutional 
mistrust; and (4) shifts in motivations and incentives for collective action.
(1) The disruptive nature of democracy – coping with discontinuity by design
A country selection criterion was the presence of a democratic form of political dispensation. 
The case studies showed that in all settings the nature of political disposition itself changed, 
impacting on MSI governance to greater or lesser degrees depending on the locus of own-
ership: governmental or societal. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, ethnic violence in 2010 brought 
about a new constitutional set-up and radical changes in political life which decentralised 
the political system, weakened central governance and bolstered nationalist groups, feeding 
instability in multi-party coalitions. Subsequent elections changed, for example, the Mayor 
of Osh requiring the renegotiation of a Memorandum of Understanding which was crucial 
for a societally owned MSI which emerged from ethnic clashes in and around the city. Costa 
Rica’s political system underwent reform which expanded political parties and opened up 
possibilities for citizens to directly lobby parliament to consider and pass legislation put up 
by popular demand. Subsequent voting cycles elected regimes with different ideological 
complexions affecting ongoing MSIs, such as a revision to the Water Law. The potential for 
societally inspired and owned MSIs increased. Kenya’s electoral processes have known wide-
spread violence, leading to indictments at the International Criminal Court as well as creating 
disruptions to the way public administration is structured nationally and how the civil service 
operates through who gains senior appointments, which tends to reflect ethnic dimensions 
in the distribution of political power. This ‘changing of the guard’ phenomenon is an inter-
pretation of shifts in Kenya’s SUN Focal Point which has been downgraded and the lead 
person responsible replaced, suggesting unstable country-owned governance.
Democratic politics is designed to change regimes and their priorities. A general principle 
is that incoming regimes will seek to express their identity by ‘recalibrating’ the policies and 
practices of their predecessors. What this means in practice is difficult to predict; that it will 
occur is inevitable. A pre-ability to cope with democratic discontinuity is an MSI pre-requisite.
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(2) Pluralisation of governance – institutional location(s) matter
Associated with the disruptive nature of democratic politics described above were shifts 
and expansions in the places from which authority was exercised, thereby increasing inter-
faces where the population can exert voice, occasionally with ‘teeth’ which was more prev-
alent at the local level. A picture in three of the four countries – Costa Rica being the exception 
– were constitutional reforms that decentralised authority to lower level jurisdictions. As 
alluded to previously, this did not necessarily translate into greater administrative or local 
political openness to public input or oversight. But where it did, local sensitivities could gain 
administrative traction, for example in indigenous control over natural resources. The 
Indonesia cases provided evidence that decentralisation has increased the complications 
of implementing MSIs through local authorities that, despite enjoinders from the central 
government, can pursue their own priorities in response to local sensibilities. The general 
point is that the institutional configuration and distribution of power is a key to societal 
ownership and how MSI governance is constructed.
(3) The issue of (mis)trust and the value of conflict
Country predispositions towards multi-institutional collaboration referred to previously 
included importance of trust in establishing effective processes for collective action. Lack 
of trust between types of stakeholders, as well as within them, features in a number of cases 
as an ineffectiveness factor. Kenya is plagued by antipathy between the current Kenyatta 
regime and civil society organisations dedicated to issues of human rights and advocacy 
more generally. Though less pointed, the establishment of MSIs in counties to bring about 
economic improvement in value chains is hindered by the mistrust of the business commu-
nity in the integrity and intentions of the political and administrative leadership. Of all coun-
tries in the study, Kenya scored worst in perceptions of corruption as well as an enabling 
environment for civic life and public engagement. Costa Rica scored best of all four in both 
regards and also provided MSI cases hosted by the private sector in collaboration with mul-
tiple levels of local civil society. By any measure, trust in the word and deed of other stake-
holders – which does not mean their likability or having a shared view of the world – is vital, 
as is the generative value of disagreement when properly managed.38
(4) Motivation and ‘missingness’
A stakeholder identification exercise was part of each case study. It included considerations 
of which stakeholder group that would be likely to have an interest in the agenda and 
objectives of an MSI was not at the table. In some cases, stakeholders’ concerns about pos-
sible co-optation made it a better strategy to observe and play a critical watchdog role of 
MSIs as they unfolded.
A distinction has been made between two frameworks for MSIs: organisation centred and 
social intervention centred. Each approach reflects different logics as drivers for MSI involve-
ment. It turns out that many MSIs offer no clear value proposition for business, a point 
confirmed by others.39 HIV/AIDS and nutrition in Indonesia had sufficient commercial sig-
nificance for engagement by pharmaceutical, mining (to protect their employees) and food 
nutrient companies. An incentive for business engagement can be a realisation that changes 
sought by MSIs are having a positive effect in terms of legitimacy of stakeholder process 
while having negative effects on commercial interests, stimulating involvement. Notable is 
that business engagement with an MSI embodying social development as an objective does 
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not seem to offer adequate reputational gain to join in. This behaviour might be allied to 
the relative lack of media engagement with MSIs or public communication strategies 
deployed by them. Reasons for this are far from clear. It is apparent that those who promote 
and design MSIs need to factor in ways of connecting or blending the logics that define 
value for for-profit, non-profit and public institutions. Without this design criterion, MSIs are 
likely to remain binary rather than tri-party affairs, potentially simplifying governance while 
narrowing the ownership base.
The task of agency: stakeholders re-make the context
The truism that ‘context matters’ calls for a fine-grained understanding of MSIs. Recent 
approaches to political economy analysis are one way of doing so,40 but can be usefully 
complemented by closer attention to that of corporate governance to gain a view of what 
MSI incentives business is sensitive to.41 Teasing out what the specificities of ‘context’ means 
for MSIs can be a valuable addition to their design. But this additional information will be of 
marginal values if stakeholders cannot or will not become more adaptable and responsive 
– a critical competency for MSI effectiveness. Put another way, stakeholders are not just in 
a context: they themselves must make the context they are in. Based on the cases, Table 4 
illustrates what this means if different types of stakeholders act against disenabling 
conditions.
Building from within is a perspective that takes the principles of societal ownership with 
inclusive governance as important factors in gaining effectiveness of development efforts. 
MSIs are a way in which societal ownership can be more widely spread beyond government 
to other institutions so that, ceteris paribus, change is more likely to endure as a ‘new normal’. 
Overall findings highlight factors which co-determine the effectiveness of MSIs that are 
driven from within, which endogenous MSIs are unlikely to avoid. Three are described below, 
starting with the ability of stakeholders to adjust to the shifting, layered landscapes in which 
they operate – a complex issue of coping with and responding to (dis)enabling environments. 
Detailed analysis of the factors respondents cited as ways to improve the MSIs with which 
they are involved provides a fairly comprehensive picture of what different types of stake-
holders need in terms of an enabling environment and responses when this is not in place 
or moves away from what is required.
The cases in our research show consistency with the propositions associated with society 
as a complex adaptive system calling for continual and timely iteration of actions towards 
objectives.42 If the metaphor for development projects is one of navigating complexity, the 
need is compounded when MSIs are in play.43 Governments lean towards uniformity in per-
spective as a default position. Typically, wide-ranging comparisons are relied on to distil 
‘consistencies’ in lessons learned, translated into ‘standardised templates’ while, at best, sug-
gesting local adjustments that do not challenge the model as such. The 17 cases in four 
country settings offer little evidence to suggest that this is a feasible way of thinking about 
increasing the probability of societal ownership-driven MSI effectiveness. This does not mean 
that templates are not valuable ways of sharing experience, but courage is needed to make 
MSIs bespoken. MSIs are best viewed as learning processes, not as bounded organisations.
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Conclusions
This paper explored an important but relatively neglected dimension of MSIs, that of societal 
(local) ownership. Doing so from a majority of endogenous empirical cases points to indi-
cators of what societal ownership means in terms of factors to be taken into account in MSI 
design, consistent with voluntary civic engagement (such as institutional location, trust, 
leadership and dealing with complicated issues of management). Also essential is the sen-
sitivity and agility to cope with democratic disruptions, as well as stakeholders’ competencies, 
commitment and energies required to alter the context to what is required for effectiveness. 
It has to be recognised that civic agency is a sine qua non for societal ownership of the SDGs.
Our enquiry started by asking what MSIs tell us about civic engagement that satisfies the 
principle of societal ownership rather than government ownership, and whether there are 
dynamics of moving from one to the other. A range of locally, as well as globally, initiated 
MSI cases were reviewed, involving four country contexts.
A first conclusion is to avoid searching for a specific and ideal MSI template, for example 
for each SDG or target. Instead there is a need to look for the appropriate balance of endog-
enous and exogenous variables which will define the strength of ownership where it matters 
– in the polity and its institutions. Each national and sub-national context will differ and 
therefore this balance is different everywhere.
A second conclusion is that the success of an MSI respecting the Paris principle of societal 
ownership is based on its capacity to involve and manage stakeholder behaviour towards 
themselves. After all, this capacity is likely to create a favourable context, giving agency to 
what otherwise has been seen as rather disempowered and ad hoc partnerships, unable to 
contribute to meaningful systemic change.
A third conclusion, and probably one of the most challenging, is that government own-
ership is less likely to arrive at successful outcomes unless there is a move towards more 
inclusive and broader societal ownership with its implications for how MSIs are governed. 
It is essential to work with the primacy of sub-national determinants of ownership that are 
essentially political rather than technical in nature. The case studies show that stakeholders 
on the ground calibrate the costs and benefits of collaboration from so many vantage points 
that top-down aggregated imperatives are simply too coarse to be relied on as a foundation 
for ownership-based agency. Multi-stakeholder dynamics require unpacking by looking at 
the primary incentives for collaboration and assessing how internal stakeholder balance 
eventually determines positive achievement over time. There is a need for future studies 
that particularly zoom in on how we can establish more precise criteria for assessing the 
successes of societally owned MSI processes, as these will be essential to determine the 
success of the SDGs a decade from now.
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